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Sliding Down the Slippery Slope of the 
Sixth Amendment 
ARGUMENTS FOR INTERPRETING PADILLA V. 
KENTUCKY NARROWLY AND LIMITING THE 
BURDEN IT PLACES ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 4, 2002, a Kentucky state court entered final 
judgment against Jose Padilla for certain charges related to the 
transport of marijuana.1 Almost eight years later, that 
commonplace occurrence2 resulted in the Supreme Court of the 
United States reevaluating the Sixth Amendment rights afforded 
to criminal defendants under the United States Constitution.3  
The state court entered judgment against Mr. Padilla 
after he pleaded guilty to “trafficking in more than five pounds 
of marijuana, possession of marijuana, [and] possession of drug 
paraphernalia.”4 Two years later, on August 18, 2004, Mr. 
Padilla filed for postconviction relief, claiming that his attorney 
had provided him with ineffective counsel by failing to advise 
him of the possible removal consequences of entering a guilty 
plea.5 According to Mr. Padilla, his attorney had been aware of 
  
 1 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 2 In 2001 the Kentucky State Police made 6755 marijuana-related arrests. 
Crime in Kentucky-2001, KY. ST. POLICE, http://www.kentuckystatepolice.org/ 
pdf/crimefacts2001.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). In 2002 that number rose to 
13,472. Crime in Kentucky-2002, KY. ST. POLICE, http://www.kentuckystatepolice.org/ 
pdf/crimefacts2002.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).  
 3 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473. 
 4 Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. In exchange for his plea, the fourth and related 
charge of “operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number” 
pending against Mr. Padilla was dismissed, and he was promised a ten-year sentence, 
only five years of which were to be served. Id. 
 5 Id. The drug trafficking offense that Mr. Padilla was charged with is 
deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (“Any alien who at any time after 
admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) 
any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a 
controlled substance . . . other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own 
use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”). 
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his status as a noncitizen, and had incorrectly advised him that 
he “did not have to worry about immigration status since he 
had been in the country so long.”6  
Mr. Padilla’s motion for postconviction relief was 
denied.7 After a series of appeals and reversals,8 the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky ultimately found that because deportation is 
a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is inapplicable where the 
petitioner complains either of a failure to advise or of the 
administration of incorrect advice regarding deportation.9 In 
2009, the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari on the matter.10 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court ultimately 
held that the two-prong Strickland v. Washington11 test for 
determining ineffective assistance of counsel did apply to Mr. 
Padilla’s claim,12 and that under the Sixth Amendment, defense 
“counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk 
of deportation.”13 In finding that advice regarding the potential 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea is the type of 
information to which a defendant is entitled under the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to counsel,14 the Court rejected the idea that 
removal could be easily defined as “either a direct or a 
collateral consequence” of a criminal conviction.15 In order to 
fully appreciate the potential future impact of the Court’s 
ruling on the criminal justice system, it is prudent to first 
understand the jurisprudence regarding ineffective assistance 
of counsel and the doctrine of collateral consequences.  
Part I of this note will describe the state of the law 
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and collateral 
consequences of criminal conviction prior to Padilla. Part II 
  
 6 Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. Mr. Padilla was born in Honduras, but at the 
time of the Supreme Court’s ruling he had lived in the United States for over forty 
years as a legal permanent resident. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.  
 7 Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
 8 The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Mr. Padilla’s 
motion and remanded the case for a hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. The Commonwealth of Kentucky then appealed that decision. Id. at 483-84. 
 9 Id. at 485. 
 10 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
 11 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see discussion infra Part I.A.  
 12 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.  
 13 Id. at 1486.  
 14 In pertinent part, the Sixth Amendment reads, “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 15 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.  
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will analyze the Padilla decision and demonstrate how the 
opinion opened the door for a slew of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims on many issues that had previously been 
deemed collateral to criminal conviction. Part III will examine 
how post-Padilla cases have interpreted the holding of the case 
in relation to specific issues. This section will argue that some 
lower courts have interpreted the decision too expansively and 
in ways that will negatively affect the criminal justice system 
and make the work of criminal defense attorneys much more 
challenging. Finally, Part IV will discuss what criminal defense 
attorneys can expect in a post-Padilla world and the steps they 
should take in order to avoid claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Additionally, this section will ultimately advocate the 
following positions: Padilla should not be applied retroactively; 
the distinction between clear and unclear immigration law 
should play a greater role in post-Padilla ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims; it is the courts that should ensure that 
defendants accepting guilty pleas have been advised of possible 
removal consequences; defense counsel should be able to put 
her client in contact with an immigration specialist in lieu of 
providing immigration advice herself; and Padilla should be 
read narrowly and should not be expanded to encompass other 
consequences that have previously been understood as 
collateral to criminal conviction.  
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE LAW BEFORE PADILLA 
As Padilla is best understood in the context of the doctrines 
of ineffective assistance of counsel and collateral consequences of 
criminal conviction, it is necessary to explore those doctrines before 
analyzing the opinion and its future implications. 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence”16 is interpreted by the 
Supreme Court as a guarantee of “‘the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.’”17 The leading case discussing the 
standards under which a defendant can successfully bring a 
  
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 17 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (emphasis added) 
(quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).  
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claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is Strickland v. 
Washington.18 The test set forth in Strickland has traditionally 
been a very difficult one to satisfy.19 In Strickland, a defendant 
who had pleaded guilty to a series of violent crimes, including 
capital murder, petitioned the Florida state court to have his 
conviction and death sentence overturned on the basis that his 
attorney had provided ineffective assistance.20 The defendant 
asserted that his counsel was ineffective in that he “failed to 
move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a 
psychiatric report, to investigate and present character 
witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, to 
present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to 
investigate the medical examiner’s reports or cross-examine 
the medical experts.”21 The requested relief was denied to the 
defendant at both the trial and appellate levels.22  
Defendant Strickland subsequently filed for a writ of 
habeas corpus in federal court, again requesting relief on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.23 His request was 
denied for the last time under the two-part test set forth by the 
Court for the determination of claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.24 The Court held that in order to make out a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show 
“that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.”25 If the defendant can meet that standard, 
he must then show that his attorney’s errors prejudiced him, 
meaning that the actions, or inactions, “actually had an 
adverse effect on the defense.”26  
Throughout the Strickland opinion, the Court indicated 
that the standard it articulated would be difficult for a 
defendant to meet. For example, the Court stated, 
  
 18 See id. at 668; LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
THE PRACTICE OF LAW 284 (Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 2008). 
 19 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an 
easy task.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 693)); Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to 
Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 427 (1988) (“Strickland[] . . . creates an 
almost insurmountable hurdle for defendants claiming ineffective assistance [of counsel].”).  
 20 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671. 
 21 Id. at 675. 
 22 Id. at 676-78. 
 23 Id. at 678. 
 24 See id. at 700-01.  
 25 Id. at 688. 
 26 Id. at 693. 
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Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess 
counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all 
too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved 
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel 
was unreasonable.27 
Additionally, the Court remarked that “court[s] should 
recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”28 Furthermore, 
even if a defendant can satisfy the first prong of the Strickland 
test by demonstrating that his attorney was in error, he must 
then show that such error in fact prejudiced him.29 This task 
seems trying, for “[a]ttorney errors . . . are as likely to be utterly 
harmless . . . as they are to be prejudicial,” and “an act or 
omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even 
brilliant in another.”30 And indeed, in the more than twenty-five 
years since Strickland was decided, it has been very difficult for 
a defendant to make a showing sufficient for a court to rule in 
his favor on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.31  
A year after its Strickland opinion, the Court extended 
the application of the Strickland test, which was formulated in 
the context of a capital sentencing proceeding, to include the 
evaluation of ineffective assistance of counsel challenges to 
guilty pleas.32 In Hill v. Lockhart, the Court explained that as it 
applies to guilty pleas, the first prong of the Strickland test “is 
nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney 
competence already set forth” in previous cases.33 This standard 
was set forth in McMann v. Richardson, where the Court 
stated that the validity of a guilty plea “depends . . . on 
whether [counsel’s] advice was within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”34 What falls within 
this range “should be left to the good sense and discretion of 
the trial [judges],” whose responsibility it is to “maintain 
  
 27 Id. at 689.  
 28 Id. at 690. 
 29 Id. at 693. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See, e.g., LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 18, at 284 (“[I]t is unlikely that a 
defendant can win an ineffective assistance appeal unless his lawyer’s performance 
was really awful.”). 
 32 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985). 
 33 Id. at 58-59. 
 34 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970). 
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proper standards of performance by attorneys.”35 In merely 
restating this reasonableness standard, Strickland does nothing 
to clarify it, and actively rejects the idea that stringent guidelines 
should be set dictating the conduct of defense counsel.36 Because 
there are no clear rules for what does and does not pass the bar, 
it has traditionally been very hard for a defendant to prove that 
his attorney’s conduct was so lacking as to violate the first prong 
of the Strickland test.37 Notably, in more recent cases, the Court 
appears to have “taken a more robust approach to the 
performance prong of the Strickland test.”38  
Even if a defendant can prove that his counsel’s advice 
regarding his guilty plea was so poor as to fall below this first 
prong standard of competence, he must then go on to meet the 
second prong of the Strickland test.39 As it applies to guilty 
pleas, this “prejudice” prong of the test requires the defendant to 
demonstrate “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
  
 35 Id. at 771. 
 36 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (“Prevailing 
norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are 
guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of 
detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how 
best to represent a criminal defendant.” (citation omitted)). 
 37 Calhoun, supra note 19, at 428 (“By adopting the amorphous ‘reasonable 
attorney’ standard and adding language about the wide range of effective assistance 
and the strong presumption favoring attorney competence, the Court has given lower 
courts the power—without giving them adequate guidance—to interpret the all-
important right to effective assistance of counsel on an ad hoc basis in a climate often 
hostile to defendants.”).  
 38 Sanjay K. Chhablani, Chronically Stricken: A Continuing Legacy of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 394 (2009); see also 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (holding that under the 1982 ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, defense counsel did not make the requisite reasonable 
efforts to examine the file regarding defendant’s prior conviction); Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (holding that under the 1989 ABA Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, defense counsel did 
not sufficiently investigate for mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
396 (2000) (holding that under the 1980 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, defense 
counsel had failed to conduct a proper investigation into the defendant’s past).  
  It may be important to note that Rompilla v. Beard, Wiggins v. Smith, and 
Williams v. Taylor are all death penalty cases. It is possible that the Court only felt the 
need to give the first prong of the Strickland test more teeth in these instances because 
the defendants’ lives were at stake. However, this still seems to denote a remarkable 
change in the Court’s ideas regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel standard, as 
Strickland itself was a death penalty case. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 39 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). It is also noteworthy that in 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, the Court announced that courts may consider the two 
prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel test in whichever order is easier for 
them. If it is clear that the alleged action, or inaction, of counsel was of no prejudice to 
the defendant, the effectiveness of counsel’s performance need never be ruled on. Id. 
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insisted on going to trial.”40 This requirement serves the 
“fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas.”41 Undermining 
finality is undesirable because it shakes “‘confidence in the 
integrity of [court] procedures . . . and . . . inevitably delays and 
impairs the orderly administration of justice.’”42 Because guilty 
pleas, not trials, produce most criminal convictions, the greatest 
negative impact on finality occurs when courts sanction new 
bases for vacating such pleas.43 Additionally, courts should err on 
the side of finality when they consider challenges to guilty pleas, 
as these challenges do not often actually raise “‘the concern that 
unfair procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an 
innocent defendant.’”44 
When determining whether the defendant challenging 
his guilty plea has met this second prong, courts will often have 
to perform the same analysis that they would have had the 
conviction been arrived at after a trial, instead of through a 
plea of guilty.45 The Supreme Court illustrated this point with 
the example of a defendant challenging his guilty plea on the 
grounds that his counsel failed to “investigate or discover 
potentially exculpatory evidence.”46 The Court explained that in 
this situation, the outcome of the second prong of the 
Strickland test will depend on the probability that “discovery of 
the evidence would have led counsel to change his 
recommendation as to the plea.”47 Furthermore, we are to 
assume that counsel would only have changed his 
recommendation if the discovered evidence would objectively 
have been likely to change the outcome of the case at trial.48  
B. Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions 
Another legal doctrine that was called into question by 
the Court’s decision in Padilla is that of collateral 
consequences of criminal convictions. The Supreme Court has 
held that the validity of a guilty plea depends on “whether the 
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 
  
 40 Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
 41 Id. at 58 (citing United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979)). 
 42 Id. (quoting Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784). 
 43 Id. (quoting Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784).  
 44 See id. (quoting Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784). 
 45 Id. at 59. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 59-60 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)).  
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alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”49 In Brady 
v. United States, the Court defined a voluntary guilty plea as 
one “‘entered by [a defendant] fully aware of the direct 
consequences.’”50 However, because Brady was not primarily 
concerned with the possible consequences of conviction, the 
Court did not elaborate on the meaning of “direct 
consequences.”51 Direct consequences are currently defined as 
those that have a “definite, immediate and largely automatic 
effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment”52 and include 
sanctions such as “jail or prison time, probationary period or a 
fine.”53 From the vague Brady definition of direct consequences 
has evolved “the so-called ‘collateral consequences’ rule,” which 
is a product of the lower state and federal courts, and states 
that “an individual’s guilty plea is constitutionally valid even if 
that person was unaware of his conviction’s ‘collateral’ 
consequences.”54 Consequences that at some time have been 
deemed collateral include “deportation, sex-offender 
registration, post-sentence involuntary civil commitment as a 
‘sexually violent predator,’ the loss of voting rights, and the loss 
of housing and employment opportunities.”55  
Commentators critical of the collateral consequences 
rule note that certain consequences that have traditionally 
been deemed collateral, such as deportation, are now in fact the 
direct result of conviction.56 For example, under the current law, 
when a noncitizen is convicted of a crime categorized as an 
aggravated felony, he will automatically and necessarily be 
removed from the country, as there are no provisions for judicial 
  
 49 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); 
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927)). 
 50 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. 
United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d on confession of 
error on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 
 51 Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent 
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 685 (2008).  
 52 Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, 
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124 n.15 
(2009) (citing Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973)).  
 53 See id. at 124-25. 
 54 Id. at 124; see also Roberts, supra note 51, at 684-85. 
 55 Roberts, supra note 52, at 124 (citing, e.g., Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 
782-83 (5th Cir. 1975); Waddy v. David, 445 F.2d. 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1971); Doe v. Weld, 954 
F. Supp. 425, 438 (D. Mass. 1996)). 
 56 Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and the Right to 
Know the Immigration Consequences of Plea Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 47, 
47-48, 56-57 (2010); Maureen Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of 
Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 47 (2010).  
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discretion in this circumstance.57 Additionally, whereas in the 
past immigration authorities were not necessarily notified when 
a noncitizen was convicted of a crime that could lead to 
deportation (and removal would therefore often take place years 
after conviction or not at all),58 today there are systems in place 
that ensure swift transitions between criminal proceedings, 
immigration proceedings, and removal.59 Furthermore, some 
criminal courts now engage in the practice of issuing removal 
orders independent of any immigration authorities.60 When 
considering the ways in which deportation has become closely 
linked to criminal procedures and convictions, it becomes harder 
to dismiss it as a merely collateral consequence. 
The idea that deportation is a collateral consequence 
has also been criticized on the basis that removal is often just 
as, or even more, serious than the direct consequences of a 
guilty plea.61 For example, when one member of a nuclear 
family is removed, the rest of the family members must decide 
whether to accept that they must live without the deported 
person, or to leave their home, family, friends, and jobs, and 
move to another country where they may have never been 
before, may not speak the language, and may not have any of 
the opportunities they had been accustomed to.62 Arguably, a 
noncitizen defendant faced with such circumstances would only 
plead guilty if he had no other choice.63 Often, when a 
noncitizen does accept a guilty plea, he will agree to lengthier 
terms of incarceration or parole, which are recognized as direct 
consequences of criminal conviction, in exchange for a plea that 
will not result in removal.64 This suggests that at least some 
noncitizen defendants consider removal to be a more serious 
consequence of a guilty plea than traditional punishments.65 
While this does not bear on how direct a consequence 
  
 57 Sweeney, supra note 56, at 70 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006)).  
 58 Id. at 71 (citing Daley v. State, 487 A.2d 320, 322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)). 
 59 Id. (citing, e.g., Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Janet 
Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec.)).  
 60 Id. at 76. 
 61 See Cruz, supra note 56, at 62; Fernando Nuñez, Are Immigration 
Consequences Really Collateral?, 34 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 323, 323 (2009); Roberts, 
supra note 52, at 124-25; Sweeney, supra note 56, at 50. 
 62 Sweeney, supra note 56, at 51.  
 63 Nuñez, supra note 61, at 337. 
 64 Sweeney, supra note 56, at 50 (citing telephone calls and e-mails 
exchanged with various federal public defenders).  
 65 Id. (citing same). 
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deportation is,66 it does demonstrate that immigration 
consequences are of the utmost importance to noncitizen 
defendants and that such defendants would benefit from 
receiving immigration advice before accepting a guilty plea.  
II. THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN PADILLA V. 
KENTUCKY 
In Padilla, the Supreme Court examined the nexus 
between an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the 
doctrine of collateral consequences as it pertains to deportation 
and held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to 
notify her client when his guilty plea may make him subject to 
deportation.67 The Court analyzed Mr. Padilla’s claim under the 
Strickland test, holding that counsel’s performance was 
constitutionally deficient under the first prong of the test, as it fell 
below a standard of “‘reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms.’”68 Although counsel in Mr. Padilla’s case 
actually provided incorrect information, as opposed to no 
information, regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty 
plea,69 the Court expressly rejected the idea of limiting its holding 
to “affirmative misadvice.”70 The Court did not rule on the second 
prong of the Strickland test, leaving the determination of 
prejudice for the Kentucky courts on remand.71 In ruling on the 
  
 66 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 67 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
 68 Id. at 1482-83 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984)); see also discussion supra Part I.A. (discussing the Strickland test). 
 69 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 70 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484. The Court gives two reasons for expanding its 
holding to include omissions, instead of just misadvice. Id. First, limiting the holding 
would encourage counsel to withhold available information from clients “fac[ing] 
possible exile from this country and separation from their families.” Id. The second 
reason the Court gives is that such a holding “would deny a class of clients least able to 
represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is 
readily available.” Id. However, it is unclear why a limited holding would actually 
incentivize counsel to withhold available information from clients, unless of course she 
believed that information she possessed was likely to be incorrect. It may be more 
accurate to say that a limited holding would provide counsel no motivation to seek out 
immigration advice for clients taking guilty pleas.  
 71 Id. at 1483-84. Although the Court ultimately did not rule on whether the 
defendant had satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, it may be interesting to 
consider whether knowledge of the correct information regarding the immigration 
consequences of Mr. Padilla’s guilty plea would have changed counsel’s recommendation. In 
order to determine this, under Hill, we should ask whether the fact that a guilty plea would 
result in Mr. Padilla’s deportation would have changed the outcome of a trial. See Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). It most likely would not have, as his immigration status 
was immaterial to the crimes of drug trafficking and operating a tractor-trailer without 
proper documentation. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev’d 
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effectiveness of Padilla’s counsel, the Court considered both the 
ways in which immigration laws have gradually become more 
oppressive in the United States (and how defense attorneys have 
supposedly adapted their practices to account for these laws) and 
the implications of deportation for noncitizen defendants.72 But 
the Court overestimated how conscientious defense attorneys 
have been in providing immigration advice and thereby opened 
the door for a large number of ineffective counsel claims. 
Additionally, by refusing to draw a line between direct and 
collateral consequences, the Court invited ineffective counsel 
claims based on other consequences that have traditionally been 
considered collateral to criminal conviction.  
A. The Court’s Account of the History of Deportation in the 
United States and of the Current Performance 
Standards for Defense Counsel  
The Padilla Court’s decision appears to be based on the 
idea that immigration law has become too harsh in the United 
States and the false assumption that criminal defense 
attorneys have been modifying their practice to account for this 
development.73 The Court traced the path of federal 
immigration laws over the last ninety years, noting that while 
the number of deportable offenses has grown considerably, the 
discretion awarded to judges as to deportation has conversely 
  
and remanded sub nom. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). However, in Hill, the 
Court also implied that where there is some circumstance or situation which is very 
important to a particular defendant, the court should consider that knowledge regarding 
this issue may have affected his decision to plead guilty. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 60. As Mr. 
Padilla had been living in the United States for approximately forty years at the time of his 
guilty plea, see supra note 6, it seems fair to consider his immigration status a very 
important circumstance. And indeed, in his appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Padilla did 
allege that if he had been advised of the effects his guilty plea would have on his 
immigration status, he would have gone to trial. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. Therefore, it 
seems plausible that if the Supreme Court had not wanted to send a strong message to 
criminal defense attorneys about their obligations to noncitizen defendants, it could have 
found a violation of the second prong of the Strickland test, and focused more on that in its 
opinion. Potentially, the Court could even have found that just as a court may dismiss an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim solely based on a prejudice prong assessment, see 
supra note 39, a court may also grant such a claim based on a prejudice prong assessment. 
Such a holding would have recognized the fact that even though an attorney’s conduct was 
not objectively unreasonable under professional norms at the time it took place, it may still 
have prejudiced the defendant. For an in-depth discussion of the interplay between Padilla 
and the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, see Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-
Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693 (2011). 
 72 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478-83. 
 73 See id. at 1478-80, 1482-83.  
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shrunk to a point where it is almost nonexistent.74 It explained 
that the passing of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1917 marked the first time that noncitizens could be deported 
based on offenses committed within the United States.75 The 
Court noted that although this Act was quite an expansion in 
immigration law, it did still include a “critically important 
procedural protection to minimize the risk of unjust 
deportation.”76 The 1917 Act allowed the sentencing judge in a 
criminal proceeding to recommend that a convicted noncitizen 
be spared deportation.77 This veto power of sorts was called a 
“judicial recommendation against deportation” (JRAD), and 
was “‘consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing 
judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular 
conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation.’”78 
However, even though the number of deportable offenses 
continued to expand, the 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act eliminated the JRAD as it applied to narcotics offenses,79 
the 1990 Congress abolished it all together,80 and the 1996 
Congress stripped the Attorney General of the power “to grant 
discretionary relief from deportation.”81 As the Court views the 
law today, “if a noncitizen has committed a removable 
offense . . . his removal is practically inevitable.”82 According to 
the Court, because of these gradual changes to the United 
States’ immigration laws, “[t]he importance of accurate legal 
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more 
important,” as “deportation is . . . sometimes the most 
important part of the penalty that may be imposed on 
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”83  
The Court stated that in light of these stringent 
immigration laws, professional custom and practice has 
evolved to “support[] the view that counsel must advise her 
client regarding the risk of deportation.”84 It went on to 
  
 74 See id. at 1478.  
 75 Id. at 1478-79 (citing S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 55 (1950)).  
 76 Id. at 1479. 
 77 Id. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 890). 
 78 Id. (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 79 Id. at 1480 (citing 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a) (1), (4) (1994)). 
 80 Id. (citing 104 Stat. 5050 (1990)). 
 81 Id. (citing 110 Stat. 3009-596 (1996)). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See id. at 1482 (citing NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, 
PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (1995); G. HERMAN, 
PLEA BARGAINING § 3.03, 20-21 (1997); Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel 
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conclude that because the first prong of the Strickland test is 
governed by “‘reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms,’” a defense attorney who fails to provide her client with 
immigration advice regarding his guilty plea falls below what 
is constitutionally required of her, especially where the 
immigration law is clear.85 The Court rejected the notion that 
requiring counsel to give such advice under Strickland would 
have a vast impact on the finality of past guilty pleas.86 Instead, 
the Court relied on the idea that defense attorneys had already 
been imposing this requirement on themselves in order to 
justify its expansive holding that defense counsel must not only 
refrain from giving incorrect advice regarding the deportation 
consequences of taking a guilty plea, but must take affirmative 
action to provide her client available information on this topic.87 
Here, the Padilla Court seems to have ignored the fact that 
multiple courts have held that defense counsel’s failure to 
provide immigration advice does not constitute an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, and that for these cases to have 
been decided, there must have been a considerable number of 
defense attorneys who were not, and most likely still are not, in 
the practice of providing their clients with advice regarding the 
possible deportation consequences of their legal actions.88 The 
  
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 713-18 (2002); A. 
CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 13:23, 555, 560 (3d ed. 2004); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 2 COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SYSTEMS, STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE, at D10, H8-H9, J8 (2000); ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 
4-5.1(a), 197 (3d ed. 1993); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 
14-3.2(f), 116 (3d ed. 1999)). 
 85 Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
Acknowledging that “[i]mmigration law can be complex, and . . . is a legal specialty of 
its own,” the Court makes a distinction between the duties of defense counsel when an 
immigration statute is clear as opposed to when it is unclear. Id. at 1483. In Mr. 
Padilla’s case, the Court deemed the immigration statute at issue “succinct, clear, and 
explicit in defining . . . removal consequences.” Id.; see also supra note 5 (providing the 
text of the statute). Therefore, because “[t]he consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily 
be determined from reading the removal statute, [and] his deportation was 
presumptively mandatory,” his counsel should have given correct advice on the risk of 
deportation, and failing to do so rendered his conduct constitutionally deficient. 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. However, the Court allowed that “[w]hen the law is not 
succinct and straightforward” defense counsel need only “advise a noncitizen client that 
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.” Id. 
But the Court failed to sufficiently explain what qualifies as “succinct and 
straightforward” and what does not. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 86 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. 
 87 Id. at 1482-85.  
 88 See id. at 1481 (citing Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327 (5th 
Cir. 2008); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
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Court thus opened the door for a potentially large number of 
post-Padilla ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
B. The Court’s Refusal to Classify Deportation as a Direct 
or Collateral Consequence of Conviction 
Before certiorari was granted, the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky held that Mr. Padilla’s claim was not subject to the 
protections of the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel because immigration, as a collateral 
issue, falls outside the scope of this protection.89 However, in 
Padilla, the Supreme Court rejected this idea, stating that the 
Court had never adopted the habit of distinguishing between 
direct and collateral consequences when applying the 
standards for ineffective assistance of counsel.90 The Court 
ultimately decided not to rule on whether immigration 
consequences are direct or collateral to convictions, noting that 
making such a judgment would be “uniquely difficult,” because of 
deportation’s “close connection to the criminal process,” and 
deeming such a distinction unnecessary “because of the unique 
nature of deportation.”91 Instead, the Court relied on the fact that 
while deportation is not a “criminal sanction” per se, it is 
undeniably very much intertwined with the criminal justice 
system.92 Additionally, the Court focused on the idea that 
immigration laws have become so strict in recent years that 
“removal [is now a] nearly automatic result for a broad class of 
noncitizen offenders.”93 Therefore, because it may be very difficult 
for these defendants to see the difference between their criminal 
  
Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1985); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Ct. 
Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State v. 
Montalban, 810 So. 2d 1106 (La. 2002); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 
1989)); see also Cruz, supra note 56, at 64 & n.134 (commenting that “the reality of a 
mandatory duty [to give immigration advice] raised some eyebrows amongst 
practitioners” (citing Mark Bennett, Padilla v. Kentucky, DEFENDING PEOPLE: THE TAO 
OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE TRIAL LAWYERING (Mar. 31, 2010, 8:38 PM), 
http://bennettandbennett.com/blog/2010/03/padilla-v-kentucky.html)). This blog notes 
that prior to Padilla, in Texas, while “[t]horough and competent criminal-defense 
lawyers would determine the immigration consequences and advise[] their clients of 
them . . . not all criminal-defense lawyers are thorough and competent, and it’s much 
easier to get the Padillas of the world to plead guilty if you gloss over those nasty 
consequences.” Id.  
 89 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 90 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.  
 91 Id. at 1481-82. 
 92 Id. at 1481. 
 93 Id.  
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sentence and their resulting civil deportation, the criminal justice 
system should not differentiate between the two either.94 Although 
the Court refused to draw a line between direct and collateral 
consequences, it did seem to adopt the arguments made by critics 
of the collateral consequences doctrine.95 The Court essentially 
ruled that because deportation is an immediate and serious 
consequence of criminal conviction, a criminal defense attorney 
should be required to provide immigration advice to a noncitizen 
client contemplating a guilty plea, lest her assistance 
subsequently be deemed ineffective.96 While this is certainly a 
victory for noncitizen defendants, and a step toward well-rounded 
advocacy, it does leave the door wide open for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to succeed in regard to a number of 
other consequences that have previously been deemed collateral.97  
III. LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF PADILLA 
There are a number of questions that Padilla leaves 
unanswered, which presumably could have been foreseen when 
the decision was announced. For example, the Court did not make 
explicit whether its decision was intended to be applied 
retroactively, nor did it enunciate the standard that should be used 
to distinguish between clear and unclear immigration laws.98 There 
are also several issues that have presented themselves as the lower 
courts have tried to apply the decision in Padilla that the Court 
may not have anticipated. For example, in the wake of Padilla, it is 
unclear whether a claim for postconviction relief will ever turn on 
whether the judge taking a plea has advised the defendant of the 
possible removal consequences of a guilty plea, without regard to 
what the defendant’s counsel discussed with him;99 whether a 
criminal defense attorney may direct her client to an independent 
  
 94 Id. at 1481-82 (citing INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001)).  
 95 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 96 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.  
 97 See discussion infra Part III.E (discussing a case in which the Court of 
Appeals of Georgia held that failing to advise a defendant that his guilty plea would 
result in his having to register as a sex offender satisfied the first prong of the Strickland 
test and suggesting that the same result could easily be reached where counsel fails to 
advise a defendant that pleading guilty will result in the loss of the right to vote). 
 98 See generally Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473. 
 99 See, e.g., United States v. Bhindar, No. 07 Cr 711-04 (LAP), 2010 WL 
2633858 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010); United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, Nos. 1:07cr337 
(LMB), 1:10cv618 (LMB), 2010 WL 2400006 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2010); Ellington v. United 
States, No. 09 Civ. 4539 (HB), 2010 WL 1631497 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010); Smith v. State, 
697 S.E.2d 177 (Ga. 2010); State v. Romos, No. 09-0585, 2010 WL 2598630 (Iowa Ct. App. 
June 30, 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
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immigration specialist once she has recognized that his case 
implicates immigration concerns;100 and whether courts will expand 
Padilla to create ineffective assistance of counsel claims for other 
consequences that have previously been deemed collateral.101  
A. Retroactivity 
In setting forth the obligations that criminal defense 
attorneys have to noncitizen defendants taking guilty pleas, 
the Padilla Court left open the problematic question of whether 
these constitutionally required standards should be applied 
retroactively.102 The doctrine of retroactivity is generally 
concerned with whether a new legal rule should be applied to 
judicial decisions that came before the pronouncement of the 
rule.103 The Supreme Court set forth its current doctrine on 
retroactivity in its 1989 Teague v. Lane opinion,104 but the 
doctrine is more clearly explained in the Court’s Whorton v. 
Bockting decision.105 In Whorton, the Court explained that “an 
old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new 
rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct 
review.”106 A new rule is one which “was not dictated by the 
governing precedent existing at the time when respondent’s 
conviction became final.”107 In order for a new rule to be 
retroactively applicable in a collateral proceeding, it must be 
either substantive, or “‘a watershed rul[e] of criminal 
procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy 
of the criminal proceeding.”108 A substantive rule, as opposed to 
a procedural rule, is one that puts “‘certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal 
law-making authority to proscribe.’”109 In other words, a 
  
 100 See, e.g., Grigorian v. United States, Nos. 09-22708-Cv-Martinez, 05-
60203-Cr-Martinez, 2010 WL 2889929 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2000), adopted by United 
States v. Grigorian, No. 09-22708-CIV, 2010 WL 2884890 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 2010); 
People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  
 101 See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). 
 102 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473. 
 103 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATIVE CASES AND COMMENTARY 16 (9th ed. 2010). 
 104 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Tom Cummins, Comment, Danforth v. Minnesota: The 
Confrontation Clause, Retroactivity, and Federalism, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255, 268-
69 (2009). 
 105 See 549 U.S. 406 (2007). 
 106 Id. at 416 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)). 
 107 Id. at 417.  
 108 Id. at 416 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).  
 109 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 
692 (1971)). 
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substantive rule changes what is thought of as a crime. A 
procedural rule can only be deemed watershed if it is 
“necessary to prevent ‘an impermissibly large risk’ of an 
inaccurate conviction,” and it “‘alter[s] our understanding of 
the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a 
proceeding.’”110 Notably, it has been over two decades since 
Teague was announced and the Court has not once applied a 
new rule retroactively.111  
In setting forth the obligations that criminal defense 
attorneys have to noncitizen defendants taking guilty pleas in 
Padilla, the Supreme Court left open the question of whether these 
constitutionally required standards should be applied retroactively. 
When the Supreme Court failed to rule on the issue of retroactivity, 
that decision was pushed down to the lower courts. Although it 
appears that a slight majority of lower courts has applied Padilla 
retroactively, there are also several courts that have declined to do 
so.112 In order to understand why it is ultimately more logical to 
apply Padilla retroactively, it may be useful to examine two cases 
that were heard in different counties within the same city, but 
reached different conclusions on the matter.113 
1. The Case for Retroactive Application: People v. 
Bennett 
In People v. Bennett, the Criminal Court for the City of 
New York, Bronx County, decided that Padilla should be 
  
 110 Bockting, 549 U.S. at 418 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 
(2004)).  
 111 Cummins, supra note 104, at 269. The only rule that the Court has ever 
deemed “watershed” was set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and 
requires that counsel be appointed for all indigent defendants facing felony charges. Id. 
at 339, 344-45. 
 112 Compare Luna v. United States, No. 10CV1659 JLS, 2010 WL 4868062 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010), and Martin v. U.S., No. 09-1387, 2010 WL 3463949 (C.D. Ill. 
Aug. 25, 2010), and United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2010), and 
Al Kokobani v. United States, Nos. 5:06-cr-207, 5:08-cv-177, 2010 WL 3941836 
(E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010), and United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 
2650625 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010), and United States v. Millan, Nos. 3:06cr458, 3:10cv165, 
2010 WL 2557699 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2010), and People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2010), and People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (all holding 
that Padilla is to be applied retroactively), with Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 
602 (E.D. Va. 2011), and United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033 (D. 
Neb. Nov. 9, 2010), and United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349, 2010 WL 4134286 
(D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010), and Gacko v. United States, No. 09-CV-4938, 2010 WL 2076020 
(E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010), and People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) 
(all holding that Padilla is not to be applied retroactively).  
 113 See Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887; Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696. 
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applied retroactively.114 Jermaine Bennett pleaded guilty to 
criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree in 
December 2005.115 He filed no direct appeals, but in November 
2009, he collaterally attacked his conviction by filing a motion 
to vacate the judgment against him on the basis that his 
defense attorney had made “affirmative misrepresentations 
and omissions of information concerning the immigration 
consequences of [his] plea.”116 Because Mr. Bennett’s conviction 
became final before Padilla was decided, the Bronx County 
Criminal Court was forced to decide whether Padilla restated 
an old rule, which would be applicable to Mr. Bennett’s case, or 
a new rule, which would not be applicable to Mr. Bennett’s case 
unless it was a substantive rule, or a watershed rule of 
criminal procedure.117  
There was no occasion for the Bronx County Court to 
determine if the Padilla rule was substantive or watershed 
because it found that the Supreme Court’s decision “did not 
announce a new constitutional rule, but merely applied the 
well-settled rule in Strickland to a particular set of facts.”118 In 
its Bennett opinion, the Bronx County Court quoted Teague in 
defining a new rule as one which “‘was not dictated by 
precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction 
became final,’”119 and concluded that the Padilla Court had not 
overruled precedent, but had simply “held that Strickland 
applies to advice concerning deportation.”120 In finding that 
Padilla simply articulates an old rule, the Bronx County Court 
also relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Williams v. 
Taylor: “merely applying Strickland to a new scenario does not 
create a new rule, as ‘it can hardly be said that recognizing the 
right to effective counsel breaks new ground or imposes a new 
obligation on the States.’”121 In ruling this way, the Bronx 
County Court also relied on its own inference that the Supreme 
Court in Padilla intended for its decision to be applied 
retroactively.122 The County Court reasoned that if this had not 
  
 114 Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 700. It is notable that Bennett was decided on 
May 26, 2010, just two short months after Padilla came down from the Supreme Court. 
 115 Id. at 697.  
 116 Id. 
 117 See id. at 698-700; see supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text 
(discussing the application of old and new constitutional rules). 
 118 Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 699.  
 119 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).  
 120 Id. (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 n.12 (2010)). 
 121 Id. (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)).  
 122 Id. at 700. 
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been the Supreme Court’s intention, it would not have felt the 
need to comment that its decision “would [not] open the 
‘floodgates’ of challenges to guilty pleas.”123 
2. The Case against Retroactive Application: People v. 
Kabre 
In People v. Kabre, the Criminal Court for the City of New 
York, New York County, reached the opposite conclusion from the 
Bronx County Court, holding the Padilla rule to be inapplicable 
retroactively on collateral review, at least as to misdemeanor 
convictions.124 The Kabre Court faced a situation similar to that 
which the Bennett Court had faced. Misdemeanor charges were 
brought against a noncitizen defendant who pleaded guilty and 
did not file a direct appeal, but subsequently collaterally attacked 
his plea on the basis that his attorney had been ineffective in 
failing to advise him, or incorrectly advising him, of the possible 
immigration consequences of pleading guilty.125 However, unlike 
the Bronx County Court, the New York County Court did not find 
that Padilla merely restated an old rule, but rather that it set 
forth “a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure.”126 
Thereafter, the New York County Court reasoned that since such 
new rules can only be taken advantage of on collateral attack 
under certain conditions not satisfied in this case, Mr. Kabre’s 
claims should simply be decided under the relevant New York 
State law at the time that the attorney conduct took place, as it is 
set forth in People v. Ford.127 Mr. Kabre’s attack on his attorney’s 
effectiveness did not succeed under this standard, as Ford 
specifically held that failing to advise of possible immigration 
consequences does not constitute ineffective assistance, as 
  
 123 Id. (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485). The Supreme Court reasoned that 
its decision would not “have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained 
as the result of plea bargains” because “[f]or at least the past 15 years, professional 
norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the 
deportation consequences of a client’s plea.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. It is interesting 
to note how many cases have since been brought alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel in regard to immigration advice and requiring lower courts to decide whether 
Padilla applies retroactively. See supra note 112.  
 124 People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (2010). Although the Bronx County 
Court in Bennett does not explicitly limit its holding to misdemeanor convictions, it is 
notable that the contested plea in that case was to New York Penal Law section 221.10 
(2), which is a class B misdemeanor. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10 (2) (McKinney 2008); 
Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
 125 See Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 890.  
 126 See id. at 889. 
 127 Id. at 889-90; see People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397 (1995); see also supra notes 103-
11 and accompanying text (discussing the application of old and new constitutional rules). 
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deportation is only a collateral consequence of criminal 
conviction.128 The New York County Court wrote off any 
indications that the Supreme Court believed Padilla would apply 
retroactively on collateral attack, noting that whatever comments 
the Court may have made, it of course intended for the Teague 
test to be applied to the Padilla holding.129  
In deciding whether to apply Padilla retroactively, the 
New York County Court first examined the state of the law in 
2005, when Mr. Kabre’s conviction was finalized.130 The New 
York County Court stated that before Padilla, “the Supreme 
Court had never held that [criminal] defense counsel . . . had 
any . . . responsibility to advise an alien defendant of the 
potential consequences of a conviction under the immigration 
laws,” and that all the United States Courts of Appeals to be 
confronted with this issue had found that deportation was “a 
collateral consequence of [a guilty plea] and that defense 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise about 
deportation or any other potential immigration consequence of 
a criminal conviction.”131 The County Court then noted that 
most state courts, including New York state courts, had 
reached the same conclusion.132 Under New York law 
  
 128 Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 889, 901 (citing Ford, 86 N.Y.2d at 404). It is 
noteworthy that at the time of Mr. Kabre’s adjudication, New York law did require that 
any immigration advice counsel chose to provide to her client be correct. See id. at 890 
(citing People v. McDonald, 802 N.E.2d 131 (2003)). However, it is unclear whether Mr. 
Kabre’s attorney gave him incorrect immigration advice or no advice at all. Id. 
 129 See id. at 897-98; see supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Teague retroactivity standard). 
 130 See Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 892-95. 
 131 Id. at 892-93 (citing Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 
20 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 
778 F.2d 764 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 132 See id. at 893-94 (citing Rumpel v. State, 847 So. 2d 399 (Ala. Crim. App. 
2002); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1972); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1995); Christie v. State, 655 A.2d 306 (Del. 1994); State v. Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 
960 (Fla. 1987); People v. Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1991); State v. Ramirez, 636 
N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 2001); State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002); Commonwealth 
v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005); State v. Montalban, 810 So. 2d 1106 (La. 
2002); People v. Davidovich, 606 N.W.2d 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d 618 N.W.2d 
579 (Mich. 2000); Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1998); State v. Zarate, 651 
N.W.2d 215 (Neb. 2002); Barajas v. State, 991 P.2d 474 (Nev. 1999); State v. Dalman, 
520 N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1994); People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 267-68 (N.Y. 1995); 
Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989); Nikolaev v. Weber, 705 N.W.2d 72 
(S.D. 2005); Bautista v. State, 160 S.W.3d 917 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004); Perez v. State, 
31 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930 (Utah 
2005); State v. Martinez-Lazo, 999 P.2d 1275 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Santos, 
401 N.W.2d 856 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)). 
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specifically, in 2005, counsel could be deemed ineffective for 
providing a client with incorrect advice regarding collateral 
consequences of a plea,133 but could avoid the issue altogether by 
remaining silent on collateral issues.134 In Padilla, the Supreme 
Court actually adopted an approach taken only by a few states 
which had previously refused to recognize a strict divide 
between direct and collateral consequences on the basis that 
deportation is so harsh a sanction.135  
After setting out the state of the law, the New York 
County Court then employed three different tests previously 
set forth by the Supreme Court in order to come to its 
conclusion that the Padilla decision created a new rule.136 First, 
the County Court asked whether the Supreme Court’s Padilla 
decision was “‘dictated’ by precedent.”137 Observing that in 2005 
neither the Supreme Court, nor the federal circuit courts, nor 
the majority of the state courts, nor the New York state courts, 
had held that “counsel’s failure to apprise a defendant of the 
immigration consequences of a plea [constituted] ineffective 
assistance or that the distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences was [irrelevant] to [a claim of] [in]effective 
assistance of counsel,” the New York County Court concluded 
that the Padilla decision was not required by any previous 
decision.138 Second, the New York County Court analyzed the 
question by asking whether the Supreme Court’s decision 
“overruled past authority,” noting that “a decision which 
overrules a prior case is obviously a new rule.”139 Although 
Padilla did not overrule Supreme Court precedent, as there was 
  
 133 Id. at 895 (citing McDonald, 802 N.E.2d 131). 
 134 Id. at 894-95 (citing Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 267). 
 135 See id. at 894 (citing Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); 
State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799 (N.M. 2004)). The New York County Court also notes that 
there are a few other courts that have used other lines of reasoning when considering 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the immigration effects of guilty pleas. Id. at 
894 n.5. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that “if counsel ha[s] reason 
to believe that a defendant [is] an alien there [is] a duty to investigate the immigration 
consequences of a conviction.” Id. (citing People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Co. 1987)). 
Although the California Supreme Court has had an opportunity to rule on whether failing 
to advise a criminal defendant of the immigration effects of a plea constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel, it has chosen not to do so, holding only “that the ‘collateral’ nature 
of such ramifications d[oes] not foreclose an ineffective assistance claim.” Id. (citing In re 
Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2001)).  
 136 See id. at 895-98. 
 137 Id. at 895 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989); Butler v. 
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990); People v. 
Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y. 1995)).  
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 896 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990)). 
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none on point, it did in effect overrule the opinions of all the 
federal circuit courts that had confronted the issue, and of the 
majority of the state courts.140 In this way, Padilla “certainly 
has . . . established a new rule in those jurisdictions.”141 The last 
test under which the New York County Court analyzed whether 
Padilla sets forth a new rule asks whether “the ‘unlawfulness of 
[defendant]’s conviction was apparent to all reasonable 
jurists.’”142 The court reasoned that any such unlawfulness would 
certainly not be obvious, seeing as the majority of the federal 
circuit courts and state courts had previously found that 
petitioners similarly situated to Mr. Padilla had no valid claims 
for ineffective assistance of counsel.143 Based on these three 
findings, the New York County Court then concluded that 
Padilla did in fact set forth a new constitutional rule.144  
After deciding that Padilla set forth a new rule, the 
New York County Court explained why neither of the two new 
rule exceptions set forth in Teague applied to the matter at 
hand.145 The County Court first set forth that the only of the two 
exceptions that the Padilla rule could possibly fit into is that of 
the “‘watershed’ rules which alter a ‘bedrock procedural 
element of criminal procedure which implicates the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial.’”146 The New 
York County Court then contrasted the Padilla rule with the 
right to counsel rule that was established under Gideon v. 
Wainwright, the only case to have ever been acknowledged as 
establishing a “watershed” rule.147 The County Court stated 
that the Padilla rule is simply “not as sweeping and 
  
 140 Id.; see also supra notes 88, 131-32 and accompanying text. 
 141 Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 896. 
 142 Id. (citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413 (2004)). 
 143 See id. 
 144 Id. at 897. In holding that Padilla set forth a new rule, the New York 
County Court also took to tearing down the Bronx County Court’s reasoning about why 
Padilla is merely a restatement of an old rule. Id. at 896-98. The New York County 
Court rails hardest against the Bronx Court’s contention that “any holding expanding 
the scope of the Sixth Amendment right under Strickland cannot be a new rule but is 
necessarily an application of settled law . . . to new facts.” See id. at 896. The New York 
County Court submits that the issue in Padilla “was not whether an alien defendant 
has the same right to a competent lawyer as . . . a citizen defendant [does under 
Strickland], but whether the scope of that representation extends to giving advice 
about the [immigration] consequences of a conviction.” Id. at 897.  
 145 See id. at 892-900; see supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.  
 146 Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 898 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 
(1989); People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y. 1995)). 
 147 Id. at 899 (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2008)); see 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
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fundamental as that of Gideon.”148 When these rules are applied 
to Mr. Kabre’s case, it is clear that while “[i]t is unconscionable 
to convict and incarcerate a defendant who had no lawyer to 
give advice about the legal process, present a defense, or argue 
for leniency,” the same cannot be said about “deny[ing] a 
hearing about what immigration advice was given six years ago 
or more to a defendant who already had a substantial criminal 
record and avoided incarceration by taking a plea.”149 Unable to 
fit the new Padilla rule into one of the known new rule 
exceptions, the New York County Court held that the rule was 
not applicable to Mr. Kabre’s collateral attack of his conviction, 
and that his claim should simply be evaluated under the laws 
of New York as they existed at the time of conviction.150 
3. Illogically, Lower Courts Rule in Favor of 
Retroactivity 
When deciding whether a rule should be applied 
retroactively, the Teague analysis, for all practical purposes, 
stops at whether a rule is to be considered old or new. This is 
because the Court has never held a new rule to fall into either 
of the two new rule exceptions, substantive or watershed 
procedural rule, and to therefore be applicable retroactively.151 
Therefore, it is important to focus on whether a holding simply 
restates an old rule, or creates a new rule by stating a principle 
not dictated by precedent, by overruling precedent, or by 
stating some principle that was not clearly true to all courts 
beforehand.152 Looking to the lower courts, it is clear that prior 
to Padilla, it was not settled that criminal defense attorneys 
had an affirmative obligation under the Constitution to provide 
immigration advice to their clients taking plea bargains.153 
Before this decision, most courts found immigration to be wholly 
collateral to a criminal conviction.154 Padilla has thus set forth a 
new rule, which would not be applicable on collateral attack. The 
strongest argument for deciding conversely that Padilla actually 
reiterated an old rule, and can therefore be applied retroactively 
  
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. Mr. Kabre had six previous counterfeiting convictions. See id. at 890. 
 150 Id. at 900. 
 151 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 152 See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text (discussing three tests the 
Supreme Court has used in the past to determine whether a rule should be considered “new”). 
 153 See supra notes 88, 131-32 and accompanying text. 
 154 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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on collateral review, is the “floodgates” language in the Court’s 
opinion which predicts it “unlikely that [Padilla] will have a 
significant effect on those convictions already obtained as a 
result of plea bargains.”155 However, the Court could simply be 
suggesting that few Padilla claims will be brought on direct 
review. In that case, we gain no insight about whether Padilla 
articulated a new rule, which may be applied only on direct 
review, or an old rule, which may be applied retroactively on 
direct review or collateral review.156 Additionally, although the 
Court did not explicitly express its opinion or rule on 
retroactivity, a slight majority of lower courts have found that 
Padilla is applicable on collateral attack.157 
B. Differentiating Between Clear and Unclear Immigration 
Law 
Another issue that the majority opinion in Padilla left 
unresolved is the standard to be used to distinguish between 
clear and unclear immigration laws.158 Surprisingly, this does 
not now seem to be a topic occupying much of the time of the 
various lower courts considering Padilla-based ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.159 One example of a case in which 
this distinction does do work is People v. Cristache, in which 
the defendant originally pleaded guilty to several charges in 
the Queens Misdemeanor Treatment Court of the City of New 
York (QMTC), based on the promise that if he completed a drug 
treatment program, his pleas would be vacated and his cases 
dismissed and sealed.160 After leaving the treatment program 
several times, and being re-arrested several times as well, Mr. 
  
 155 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).  
 156 See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text (discussing the application 
of old and new constitutional rules). 
 157 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 158 See supra note 85. 
 159 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court . . . holds 
that a criminal defense attorney must provide advice in th[e] specialized area [of 
immigration] in those cases in which the law is ‘succinct and straightforward’—but not, 
perhaps, in other situations. This vague, halfway test will lead to much confusion and 
needless litigation.” (citation omitted)). One explanation for why state courts have shied 
away from distinguishing clear from unclear immigration laws is that they simply do not 
have the ability to do so. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, When State Courts 
Meet Padilla: A Concerted Effort Is Needed to Bring State Courts Up to Speed on Crime-
Based Immigration Law Provisions, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 299, 311 (2011) (stating that 
“state courts . . . are not sufficiently familiar with immigration law to determine when 
deportation will clearly result from pleading guilty to a particular offense”). 
 160 People v. Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834-36 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010). 
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Cristache was eventually sentenced to several months in jail.161 
Two months after his sentencing, Mr. Cristache moved to have 
his pleas vacated under Padilla on the basis that his defense 
attorney had not informed him of the potential immigration 
consequences of his guilty pleas.162 
In this case, whether defense counsel’s advice was effective 
under Strickland turned on whether the immigration law 
surrounding Mr. Cristache’s guilty pleas was clear or unclear.163 
The Cristache Court determined that although the defendant had 
pleaded guilty to crimes that qualified as removable offenses, they 
were not of the sort “which would have clearly subjected him to 
‘automatic’ or ‘mandatory’ removal or deportation,” as they would 
not be classified as “aggravated felon[ies].”164 Therefore, the 
Cristache Court reasoned that here, “where the removal 
‘consequences of [defendant’s] . . . plea[s] . . . [were] unclear or 
uncertain,’” defense counsel was required to “‘do no more than 
advise [defendant] that pending criminal charges may carry a risk 
of adverse immigration consequences.’”165 The Cristache Court 
found that defense counsel in this case did in fact do enough to 
satisfy the Padilla rule by advising defendant that “he would have 
a criminal record . . . and he would have immigration 
consequences,” if he did not complete his court-mandated drug 
treatment program.166 While it would have been more favorable for 
defense counsel to have expounded upon this advice, ultimately she 
gave enough advice so that her conduct was not “constitutionally 
deficient under the performance prong of Strickland.”167  
The Cristache Court demonstrated how the distinction 
between clear and unclear immigration laws can be used to 
limit how many of the numerous ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims that have arisen since Padilla was announced 
will succeed. Although few post-Padilla courts have used this 
  
 161 Id. at 836. 
 162 Id. at 836-37. 
 163 See id. at 842-46. 
 164 Id. at 842-43 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii); 
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 325 (2001); Zhang v. United States, 506 F.3d 162, 167 (2d 
Cir. 2007); People v. Argueta, 46 A.D.3d 46, 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)).  
 165 Id. at 843 (alterations in original) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1483 (2010)). 
 166 Id. Although Mr. Cristache actually alleged that defense counsel gave him 
no advice at all regarding the possible immigration consequences of his pleas, the 
Cristache Court credited defense counsel’s contention that indeed she did. Id.  
  For the argument that the Cristache Court misinterpreted the immigration 
law, and that Mr. Cristache’s conviction actually “clearly subjected him to removal,” 
see Hernández, supra note 159, at 319-22.  
 167 Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 845. 
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distinction as the basis for their decisions, it would prove a 
useful tool if more liberally employed.  
C. The Role of the Judge in Post-Padilla Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims 
Although a claim of ineffective counsel brought under 
Strickland (and under Padilla when such claim is specifically 
regarding a failure to give immigration advice in relation to a 
guilty plea) normally focuses on the actions or inaction of 
defense counsel,168 the presiding court’s actions are also 
relevant.169 In fact, several post-Padilla decisions in the lower 
courts have stated that where the court advised the defendant 
of the potential immigration consequences of his plea during 
the plea allocution, the defendant cannot satisfy the second 
“prejudice” prong of the Strickland test.170 This seems to be a 
logical conclusion considering that the prejudice prong can only 
be satisfied for guilty pleas where, if not for defense counsel’s 
errors, the defendant would have decided to go to trial.171 It 
would be illogical for a defendant bringing an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim to allege that he would have 
withdrawn his decision to plead guilty if only the words spoken 
to him by the court during his plea allocution had instead been 
uttered by his defense attorney. However, a few courts have 
nonetheless held that a defendant may succeed with such a 
claim regardless of the warnings given by the court.172  
  
 168 See discussion of Strickland supra Part I.A; see discussion of Padilla supra 
Part II. 
 169 See, e.g., United States v. Bhindar, No. 07Cr711-04, 2010 WL 2633858, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010); United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, No. 1:07cr337, 1:10cv618, 
2010 WL 2400006, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2010), aff’d in part, dismissed in part, 404 F. 
App’x 714 (4th Cir. 2010); Ellington v. United States, No. 09CIV4539, 2010 WL 1631497, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010); Flores v. State, 57 So. 3d 218, 218-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010); People v. DeJesus, No. 10335/98, 2010 WL 5300535, at *11-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 
24, 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 405-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  
 170 Bhindar, 2010 WL 2633858, at *6; Ellington, 2010 WL 1631497, at *3; 
Flores, 57 So. 3d at 218-21.  
 171 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 172 See DeJesus, 2010 WL 5300535, at *11-12; Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 405-07. 
It is unclear whether it is significant that both of these cases were decided in New York 
State courts (one in Kings County and one in New York County). It is possible that 
New York State courts are more sympathetic to defendants bringing ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims under Padilla than are the federal courts, or the courts of 
other states. However, it is also possible that New York State, especially New York 
City, simply deals with a greater quantity of such claims, and this just happens to be 
how these two specific cases came out. It is also important to note that New York City 
has not been so liberal in regard to all aspects of claims brought under Padilla. For 
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1. If the Defendant Was on Notice, He Cannot Prove 
Prejudice 
Among the courts that have explicitly noted that a 
court’s warning regarding immigration consequences is enough 
to defeat a Strickland claim under the prejudice prong are the 
Southern District of New York and the District Court of Appeal 
of Florida.173 In Ellington v. United States, the Southern District 
found that where the judge who took the plea allocution asked 
the defendant, “Do you recognize that your plea of 
guilty . . . may affect your ability to remain within the United 
States?” and the defendant replied, “Yes,” it was irrelevant 
whether defense counsel had informed the defendant of the 
possible deportation consequences of entering a plea.174 This 
was because the judge had “explained the issue in open 
court.”175 In United States v. Bhindar, the Southern District 
reiterated this principle, stating that the defendant “would be 
hard-pressed to show that the ineffective assistance of counsel 
prejudiced his defense” where he had verbally indicated his 
understanding after the judge taking his plea told him, “[O]ne 
of the consequences of your plea, if you are not a citizen of the 
United States is that, at the conclusion of your sentence, you 
will be removed from the United States.”176 The court ruled this 
way despite the fact that the defendant was not claiming that 
his counsel had failed to advise him, but that he had actually 
given him misinformation.177 This was because the court’s 
warning had put the defendant on notice that there would in 
fact be immigration consequences from entering a plea of 
guilty, regardless of what his attorney had previously told 
him.178 In Flores v. State, the District Court of Appeal of Florida 
held that an ineffective assistance claim would fail under the 
second prong of Strickland where the court gave correct 
immigration advice during the plea colloquy, even though 
defense counsel had previously given incorrect immigration 
advice that the defendant thought safe to follow.179 In this case, 
  
example, Part III.A.2 discusses a New York County case in which the court decided 
that Padilla should not apply retroactively.  
 173 See Bhindar, 2010 WL 2633858, at *6; Ellington, 2010 WL 1631497, at *3; 
Flores, 57 So. 3d at 218-21.  
 174 Ellington, 2010 WL 1631497, at *3.  
 175 Id.  
 176 Bhindar, 2010 WL 2633858, at *5-6. 
 177 Id. at *3-5. 
 178 Id. at *6 (citing Zhang v. United States, 506 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 179 Flores v. State, 57 So. 3d 218, 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
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the court relied mainly on the principle that the defendant had 
sworn during his plea that he understood the court’s warning, 
and should not later be allowed to change his answer.180  
2. But, the Defendant May Have Been Prejudiced if He 
Did Not Understand the Court’s Warning  
In contrast to the opinions of the Southern District of 
New York and the District Court of Appeal of Florida, the 
branches of the New York Supreme Court sitting in the 
Counties of Kings and New York have found that ineffective 
assistance claims may succeed even where the court warned 
the defendant of the possible immigration consequences of his 
plea.181 In People v. Garcia, the New York Supreme Court for 
the County of Kings specifically rejected the Southern District’s 
Bhindar holding, instead ruling that when a defendant has 
been misled by advice, or has not been given any advice, 
regarding the immigration consequences of entering a guilty 
plea, “the Court’s general warning will not automatically cure 
counsel’s failure nor erase the consequent prejudice.”182 Rather, 
a defendant in such a situation might still be able to succeed 
with a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, as Mr. Garcia 
did.183 Additionally, in People v. DeJesus, the New York 
Supreme Court for the County of New York held that where a 
defendant alleges that his attorney did not advise him of the 
deportation effects of his plea, that he did not understand the 
warning given by the court, and that he believed he could rely 
on his counsel’s advice to enter a plea of guilty, he may still be 
able to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.184 
3. Garcia and DeJesus Prejudice the System 
The Garcia and DeJesus decisions are counterintuitive, if 
not completely irrational. Although it is true that a Strickland 
claim is supposed to address the conduct of counsel and not of the 
court, it is far from clear how a defendant can remain prejudiced 
under the second Strickland prong by the lack of information or 
  
 180 Flores, 57 So. 3d at 220 (citing Iacono v. State, 930 So. 2d 829 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2006)).  
 181 See People v. DeJesus, No. 10335/98, 2010 WL 5300535, at *11-12 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Dec. 24, 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 406-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  
 182 Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07. 
 183 Id. at 407. 
 184 DeJesus, 2010 WL 5300535, at *11-12. 
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misinformation supplied by counsel, after he is given correct 
information by the court. This is particularly hard to understand if 
it is assumed that anyone facing charges before a court knows that 
an attorney is present to provide assistance, but that the judge 
makes the final decisions. Additionally, decisions such as these 
leave the courts without a way to limit the number of claims for 
ineffective assistance of counsel brought under Padilla. Although 
courts could not possibly possess the resources to watch over every 
interaction between counsel and defendant, making sure the 
proper advice regarding guilty pleas and immigration is given,185 
they do have the ability to ask the defendant in open court during a 
plea colloquy whether the defendant was advised of the fact that 
his plea may result in deportation. If the court cannot rely on the 
defendant’s answer to such a question, it is unclear how else a 
court could ensure that proper advice was given.  
D. Determining When a Criminal Defense Attorney May 
Defer to an Immigration Specialist 
In Padilla, the Court acknowledged that immigration law 
is a complex subject in its own right, and consequently limited the 
extent of the advice that is required when the pertinent 
immigration law is unclear.186 However, even where the law 
appears clear, a criminal defense attorney might think it 
provident to consult with an immigration specialist before 
advising her client on the possible immigration ramifications of 
accepting a guilty plea, or perhaps to simply refer her client to 
such a specialist. By analyzing two cases that have emerged from 
this type of attorney conduct, it becomes clear that while a 
defense attorney may engage an immigration specialist to further 
assist her client, she does not satisfy her duty under Padilla by 
pleading ignorance of immigration law and telling her client to 
seek counsel elsewhere on that issue.187 In cases such as these, it is 
important to focus on three questions: whether the criminal 
defense attorney has given any immigration advice at all; 
whether she actually facilitated contact with an immigration 
  
 185 The author is ignoring the confidentiality and privilege issues which would 
obviously be implicated if courts were to watch over the interactions between attorney 
and client, in order to make a point. 
 186 See supra note 85. 
 187 See Grigorian v. United States, Nos. 09-22708-Cv-Martinez, 05-60203-Cr-
Martinez, 2010 WL 2889929 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2010), adopted by United States v. 
Grigorian, No. 09-22708-CIV, 2010 WL 2884890 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 2010); Garcia, 907 
N.Y.S.2d 398.  
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counselor, as opposed to just suggesting it; and whether the 
advice given by the immigration specialist was correct.  
1. A Defense Attorney May Enlist the Assistance of an 
Immigration Specialist 
In Grigorian v. United States, the Southern District of 
Florida held that Mr. Grigorian had not been deprived of 
effective assistance of counsel where his criminal defense 
attorney warned him that he would be deported if he accepted a 
guilty plea, and the immigration specialist whom his defense 
attorney recommended he consult, in contrast, advised him to 
take a plea, as going to trial would likely lead to conviction and 
serious immigration consequences.188 Mr. Grigorian argued 
essentially that his defense attorney had made the possibility of 
deportation upon acceptance of a guilty plea sound too definite, 
and that if he had known he would have been entitled to a 
deportation proceeding where he could argue the case for letting 
him remain in the United States, he would have pleaded guilty.189 
The court found that Mr. Grigorian had in fact received enough 
information regarding the potential immigration consequences of 
going to trial, and of pleading guilty, and that his defense counsel 
had thus not been deficient in his performance.190  
2. A Defense Attorney May Not Abdicate Her Duties to 
an Immigration Specialist 
The New York Supreme Court for the County of Kings 
has also ruled on a Padilla ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim involving an independent immigration specialist.191 In 
People v. Garcia, the New York Supreme Court held that the 
Padilla standard is not met, and counsel’s performance is 
  
 188 See Grigorian, 2010 WL 2889929, at *3-4, *7. It is noteworthy that Mr. 
Grigorian did not actually plead guilty, but rather proceeded to trial and was convicted 
of an aggravated felony, subjecting him to deportation. See id. at *1, *4. While the facts 
of this case are different from those of Padilla, in that Mr. Padilla accepted a guilty 
plea, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, the case still deals with the duty of the 
criminal defense attorney when counseling her client on the choice between a plea and 
a trial. Grigorian, 2010 WL 2889929, at *6.  
 189 See Grigorian, 2010 WL 2889929, at *3. While Mr. Grigorian contends that 
he would have pleaded guilty, presumably to a lesser offense, had he known that he 
would be entitled to an immigration proceeding, this is of no consequence because 
despite his defense attorney’s efforts, the government never offered him a plea bargain 
to anything less than an aggravated felony. See id. at *3-4. 
 190 Id. at *6-7. 
 191 See Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 399.  
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therefore deficient, where a criminal defense attorney tells her 
client that she has no knowledge of the immigration law and 
that he should seek independent advice; the client does seek 
advice; and he receives incorrect information.192 Upon being 
informed by his defense attorney that he would have to inquire 
elsewhere as to the immigration consequences of taking a guilty 
plea, Mr. Garcia sought the advice of the only immigration 
professional whose assistance he could afford: a paralegal.193 This 
person incorrectly advised Mr. Garcia that pleading guilty to a 
single misdemeanor would not result in any negative 
immigration effects, and Mr. Garcia subsequently accepted a 
plea of guilty to one misdemeanor count of drug possession.194  
3. Grigorian and Garcia: Elucidating the Proper Role of 
the Immigration Specialist in the Criminal Proceeding 
When viewed together, Grigorian and Garcia present an 
idea of the different types of scenarios that may arise when a 
criminal defense attorney recommends her client seek the advice 
of an experienced immigration attorney. Grigorian suggests that 
it is proper for a defense attorney to direct her client to an 
immigration expert for additional counseling, where she has 
already provided him with limited, yet sufficient, advice on the 
possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Garcia 
reinforces the idea that a defense attorney must directly provide 
some immigration advice in order to meet the Padilla standard. 
Additionally, Garcia suggests that where a client is referred to 
an independent specialist by his defense attorney, the defense 
attorney must actually facilitate the contact with the specialist, 
and may be responsible if the specialist provides incorrect 
advice. However, these two cases are rather fact-specific and 
their holdings do not necessarily offer much assistance in 
determining the proper role of the independent immigration 
specialist in criminal defense cases in general.  
  
 192 Id. at 405. Notably, the New York Supreme Court did ultimately grant Mr. 
Garcia’s motion to vacate his plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 
407. In addition to counsel’s performance being deficient, the court also found that Mr. 
Garcia had met the burden of proving the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Id. at 
406-07. The court reasoned that if Mr. Garcia was so worried about the immigration 
consequences of his plea that he felt the need to ask his defense attorney about them, 
and seek assistance elsewhere when his attorney could not assist him, he would not 
have pleaded guilty had he been properly informed that entering a guilty plea would 
result in deportation. Id. at 406. 
 193 Id. at 400.  
 194 Id. at 399-400.  
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For example, Grigorian and Garcia would not provide 
much guidance in a situation where a criminal defense 
attorney failed to personally provide immigration advice, but 
ensured that her client had unhampered access to a reputable 
immigration attorney, who ultimately provided correct advice. 
Nor do these cases evince a standard for a case where defense 
counsel gave limited but sufficient advice, but also provided her 
client access to a more experienced immigration attorney, who 
subsequently gave the client incorrect advice. In the first 
hypothetical situation, it would be preposterous to deem the 
criminal defense attorney’s conduct ineffective simply because 
she was not the direct source of the relevant and correct 
immigration advice. In the second situation, the proper 
outcome of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against 
the defense attorney seems less clear, as the misadvised client 
should certainly have some recourse after being given incorrect 
information. However, it would ultimately be ridiculous to hold 
the defense attorney’s performance ineffective, as it would be 
illogical to require a criminal defense attorney to know that an 
immigration attorney’s advice is incorrect, as a defense attorney 
would only seek out an immigration attorney precisely because 
she has limited knowledge of the subject area. It could hardly be 
argued that defense counsel would fall below professional 
standards of conduct by providing her client access to an 
immigration specialist, even where the immigration attorney’s 
advice ends up being incorrect.195 The proper role of a criminal 
defense attorney representing a noncitizen should be to facilitate 
contact between her client and an attorney who is well versed in 
immigration law.196 There is no reason that a defense attorney 
should be required to provide immigration advice first hand, and 
it would be unfair to hold a defense attorney responsible for the 
errors of an immigration specialist.197  
  
 195 Although this situation would not meet the first prong of the Strickland 
test, it would certainly seem to prejudice the defendant involved. This calls attention to 
the idea that the Strickland test may fail where behavior that does not qualify as 
deficient under the first prong of the test creates a situation that would meet the 
second prejudice prong. See supra note 71.  
 196 For more ideas on the best practices for representing noncitizens in criminal 
proceedings, see Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky? Thoughts 
on Implementation and Future Directions, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 366-69 (2011) (“The 
greatest likelihood of successful representation of noncitizen clients is with the collaboration 
of all those partners currently engaged in the various fields . . . .”). 
 197 It is true that when a defendant files a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel requesting that his plea or conviction be reversed he is not making a case aimed 
at holding his attorney responsible. However, if a defendant can make out a claim for 
ineffective assistance under Strickland, see discussion supra Part I.A, for a violation of his 
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E. Expanding Padilla 
When the Padilla Court decided that a criminal defense 
attorney must advise her noncitizen client of the potential 
immigration effects of a plea bargain,198 despite the fact that 
deportation has traditionally been considered a collateral effect 
by lower state and federal courts,199 it opened up the door to 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on a lack of 
advice or misadvice regarding other consequences that have 
generally also been considered collateral. For example, several 
courts have subsequently faced the question of whether to 
extend the Padilla reasoning to the consequence of being 
required to register as a sex offender.200 At least two courts have 
held that ineffective assistance of counsel will be found where 
plea counsel fails to advise her client that his guilty plea will 
result in his having to register as a sex offender.201  
In order to support such a holding regarding sex 
offender registration, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Taylor v. 
State relied on the factors it believed the Supreme Court used 
to support its holding regarding deportation.202 Namely, the 
  
rights under Padilla, see discussion supra Part II, he will most likely also be able to make 
out a tort claim for legal malpractice under a theory of negligence. To prove such a 
malpractice claim, the proponent of the suit has to show that the lawyer in question owed 
him a duty, “that the lawyer failed to exercise the competence and diligence normally 
exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances,” and that the lawyer’s failures caused him 
actual harm. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 18, at 129 (citations omitted). However, it is 
notable that several jurisdictions require a defendant to additionally prove his innocence 
in order to prevail on a criminal malpractice claim. See, e.g., Wiley v. Cnty. of San Diego, 
19 Cal. 4th 532, 534 (1998); Schreiber v. Rowe, 814 So. 2d 396, 399-400 (Fla. 2002); 
Rodriguez v. Neilsen, 609 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Neb. 2000); Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, 
Steen & Gordon, P.A., 727 A.2d 996, 999-1000 (N.H. 1999). Thus, it is possible that many 
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty without proper immigration advice from their 
attorneys will not ultimately be able to hold those attorneys civilly liable. Even so, an 
attorney may always be held responsible for her actions, through sanctions and other 
means, under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct propounded in the pertinent 
jurisdiction. Where a criminal defense attorney does not provide the advice required 
under Padilla, a defendant may report to the relevant bar association that his attorney 
failed to provide him with competent representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”).  
 198 See discussion supra Part II. 
 199 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 200 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333, at 
*1 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010); United States v. Rose, No. ACM 36508, 2010 WL 4068976, 
at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 11, 2010); Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 385 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2010); State in Interest of C.P.H., No. FJ-03-1313-02, 2010 WL 2926541, at *1 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2010).  
 201 See Rose, 2010 WL 4068976, at *4-5; Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 388.  
 202 See Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 387-88.  
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court of appeals endeavored to decide whether professional 
custom and practice require advisement on sex offender 
registration, whether this consequence is closely linked to the 
criminal process, and whether it is comparably as serious as 
deportation.203 The court of appeals relied on an ABA 
publication in deciding that professional standards do require 
advice regarding sex offender registration.204 As to the link 
between conviction and registration, the court of appeals noted 
that under Georgia law, registration is mandatory for certain 
offenders, much the same way deportation is.205 Lastly, the 
Georgia court found that being forced to register as a sex 
offender is equally as severe a consequence as being deported 
in that it is a life-long requirement which restricts a 
registrant’s choices as to residence and profession, and 
noncompliance with which is a felony.206  
While none of these conclusions appears to be wholly 
illogical, it is troubling that the same reasoning can be applied 
to most other consequences that have traditionally been 
deemed collateral.207 For example, a court could easily satisfy 
these three factors in relation to the loss of voting rights.208 
Holding that criminal defense attorneys are constitutionally 
bound to advise of any consequences that are pointed out by 
the ABA, that follow in some sense from conviction, and that 
can be considered severe, would open up our already overtaxed 
  
 203 See id. at 388-89. Note the Padilla holding has also been interpreted as 
based on two, as opposed to three, factors: close connection to criminal process and 
severity. See Sixth Amendment—Effective Assistance of Counsel, 124 HARV. L. REV. 199, 
206-07 (2010). 
 204 Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 388 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
PLEAS OF GUILTY, 14-3.2(f), cmt. (3d. ed. 1999)).  
 205 Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(e)).  
 206 Id. at 388-89 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-12(n), 42-1-15).  
 207 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 208 As to the professional norms factor, the ABA publication which the Georgia 
court cites advises that defense attorneys apprise their clients of all potential collateral 
consequences before entering a plea of guilty. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999). With regard to the factor of how 
closely related the loss of voting rights is to criminal conviction, approximately 5.3 
million Americans are prevented from voting each year, simply by virtue of the fact 
that they have been convicted of felonies. Voting Rights, SENT’G PROJECT, RES. & ADVOC. 
FOR REFORM, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=133 (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2011). Finally, with respect to the severity of being refused the right to vote, it is 
undeniable that suffrage is a right that both black and female Americans of the past 
fought a long time to win, and one that we find of the utmost importance as a democratic 
society. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX; Hon. Anna Blackburne-Rigsby, Black Women 
Judges: The Historical Journey of Black Women to the Nation’s Highest Courts, 53 HOW. 
L.J. 645, 653-56 (2010); S. Brannon Latimer, Comment, Can Felon Disenfranchisement 
Survive Under Modern Conceptions of Voting Rights?: Political Philosophy, State 
Interests, and Scholarly Scorn, 59 SMU L. REV. 1841, 1841, 1843-44 (2006). 
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court systems209 to innumerable new ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. One commentator estimates that each state 
defines as many as several hundred consequences to criminal 
conviction as collateral.210 In light of the easily satisfied factors 
that Padilla leaves us with, there is no limit to the types of 
advice we could potentially require criminal defense attorneys 
to provide. For example, the Constitution might eventually be 
interpreted to require that defense attorneys inform clients 
that if they are convicted of certain crimes they will never be 
able to adopt a child.211 This liberal expansion of the type of 
advice that criminal defense attorneys are required to provide 
leads us down a path where legal professionals who were trained 
to navigate the criminal court system and negotiate plea deals 
for lesser charges and lower sentences are instead acting as 
therapists and life coaches, discussing with their clients all the 
social repercussions of committing a crime. While it may be 
admirable to try to provide a client with all the information that 
could possibly be relevant to him, it is simply impractical in the 
real world of limited financial and human resources.212 It is clear 
that the Supreme Court has extended claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel to encompass failure to provide 
immigration advice regarding guilty pleas, but lower federal and 
state courts should not extend that holding any further.  
  
 209 Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished Opinions, 44 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723, 752 (2008) (noting that some federal and state court systems 
are overburdened). 
 210 Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral 
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 686 (2011). 
 211 What Are the Requirements to Adopt a Baby?, LIVESTRONG.COM (MAY 20, 
2010), http://www.livestrong.com/article/127624-requirements-adopt-baby/ (noting that 
under federal law individuals convicted of “felony child abuse or neglect; violent crime; 
spousal abuse; or a crime against children” may not adopt, and that individual states 
may have additional restrictions).  
 212 See Sweeney, supra note 196, at 360-64 (discussing the resource challenges 
that may be encountered when advising noncitizen criminal defendants). 
  It is noteworthy that the American Bar Association has accepted a contract 
with the National Institute of Justice to perform a fifty-state survey of the collateral 
consequences defined under each state’s laws. See Chin, supra note 210, at 685. 
However, it is unclear when this undertaking will be completed, and whether funding 
will be provided to keep the surveys current. If such surveys are completed and kept 
current, it would then be much more reasonable to require criminal defense attorneys 
to apprise their clients of collateral consequences of conviction. Still, it would always be 
impractical to require an attorney to provide information on all possible consequences, 
as they are extremely numerous. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
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IV. PREDICTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. What Criminal Defense Attorneys Should Expect in a 
Post-Padilla World 
In the wake of Padilla, not much is certain at the 
intersection of criminal defense and immigration law. However, 
it is clear that Padilla has produced an onslaught of new 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. When one of these 
claims arises on collateral attack, a criminal defense attorney 
may not be able to predict whether the presiding court will 
apply Padilla retroactively. It does appear that a slight 
majority of jurisdictions have ruled in favor of applying Padilla 
retroactively.213 When a court considers a motion to vacate a 
guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Padilla, it is unlikely that they will draw a line between clear 
and unclear immigration laws.214 Therefore, going forward, it 
would be provident for defense attorneys to always give the 
most extensive and accurate immigration advice possible when 
dealing with noncitizen clients. If there is any chance that the 
immigration law in question could be considered clear, a 
defense attorney should research the issue and advise on it.  
Criminal defense attorneys with little knowledge of 
immigration law should still make their best efforts to advise 
clients on whether accepting a guilty plea would result in 
deportation. At that point, the attorney may want to enlist an 
immigration specialist who can advise the client in more detail.215 
However, where a defense attorney suggests such an 
arrangement, she should take responsibility for facilitating contact 
between the two parties, and realize that she may be held 
accountable in a claim for ineffective assistance if the immigration 
professional provides erroneous advice.216 Additionally, a defense 
attorney would be wise to put on the record during her client’s plea 
allocution that she did in fact discuss the particular immigration 
consequences of the charged offense with her client.217 However, 
she should not expect that a claim for ineffective assistance will 
necessarily be undermined by the presiding judge advising the 
client of the possible consequences of his plea during his 
  
 213 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 214 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 215 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 216 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 217 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
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allocution.218 Finally, a criminal defense attorney should be 
prepared for the fact that after Padilla, ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims may arise where she failed to provide advice on any 
number of collateral consequences.219 
B. Recommendation: An Ideal Post-Padilla World 
Although the previous section contains a summary of 
what practitioners should expect in light of the way lower 
courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s Padilla decision, 
it is certainly not a summary of what would be best for our 
criminal justice system. For example, Padilla should not be 
applied retroactively because doing so would disturb the 
finality of many pleas. This, in turn, would produce a massive 
caseload in the form of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 
which would result in new trials that our overburdened system 
is not equipped to handle. Additionally, when dealing with 
Padilla-based ineffective assistance of counsel claims, courts 
should make a practice of distinguishing between clear and 
unclear immigration law, as this may prove a useful method for 
weeding out meritless claims. Furthermore, ineffective 
assistance claims should be immediately dismissed based on 
the prejudice prong of the Strickland test where the record of 
the plea colloquy indicates either that the presiding judge 
asked the defendant whether his counsel had advised him of 
the immigration consequences of his plea, and the defendant 
answered in the affirmative, or that the judge herself informed 
the defendant of the consequences. As a counter to the 
argument that some defendants will not necessarily take the 
judge’s advice over that already provided by their attorney, plea 
colloquies should be lengthened so that the judge may explain in 
depth the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea and 
also obtain a more detailed account of the advice that was given 
by the defense attorney. This will certainly take up less time and 
resources than conducting numerous new trials resulting from 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Additionally, when an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on a defense 
attorney’s failure to personally advise of the immigration 
consequences of accepting a plea, it should be discounted if 
defense counsel did in fact facilitate her client’s access to a 
competent immigration attorney, even where that immigration 
  
 218 See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
 219 See discussion supra Part III.E. 
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attorney actually provided erroneous advice. Finally, the Padilla 
holding should not be extended beyond immigration consequences 
to other effects of conviction that have previously been deemed 
collateral. Such an extension leads us down a road where we can 
no longer recognize the role of the criminal defense attorney. 
CONCLUSION 
While the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla v. 
Kentucky was certainly a victory for noncitizen criminal 
defendants, and was perhaps appropriate in light of the current 
state of immigration law, its effects will only remain positive if 
it is construed narrowly by the lower courts. Such a course of 
action will respect the fact that immigration matters are 
serious, and that deportation is a harsh consequence, without 
overburdening court systems and criminal defense attorneys. 
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